Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1959

Moon Lake Electric Association Inc. et al v. Utah
State Tax Commission : Brief of Defendant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Raymond W. Gee; John G. Marshall; Attorneys for Defendant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Moon Lake Electric Ass'n Inc. v. Utah Tax Comm., No. 9010 (Utah Supreme Court, 1959).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3289

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

L·~· T1 !!

1959

Lt\ vv' LH3RAR'(

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah

FILED

MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIA-1~b9
TION INCORPORATED, a corporat'lon, an d UINTAH BASIN TELE- ------- ----,;_--------------·--------------------------------·L-lerk, Supri!imlii c,.wrt, Utah ~
PHONE ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation,
Case No.
Plaintiffs,
9010
vs.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,
RAYMOND W. GEE,
Assistant Attorney General,
JOHN G. MARSHALL,
Assistant Attorney _General,
Attorneys for Defendant.

ARROW PRESS, 8ALT LAKI!

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................... .

1

STATEMENT OF POINTS ..

2

ARGUMENT

3

POINT I. SECTION 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 AND
SECTION 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
UTAH
........................

3

POINT II. SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953,
AND 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED,
VIOLATE SECTION 11, ARTICLE XIII OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
.......

12

POINT III. SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953,
AND 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED,
VIOLATE SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI, OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH . . . . . . . . . .

13

CONCLUSION ..... .

15

.......................

AUTHORITIES CITED

50 Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

82 C. J. S., Statutes, Sec. 166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2 Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2104

14

CASES CITED

State v. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166, 53 P. 981 . . . . . . . . . .

7

State ex rei. P. S. C. v. Southern Pacific Co. et al., 95
Utah 84, 79 P. 2d 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page
State v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 P. 615 . .

. ...... 4, 5

Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272 . .

. .... 9,11

STATUTES CITED

Constitution of Utah, Art. VI, Sec. 26 ............... 3, 13
Constitution of Utah, Art. XIII, Sees. 2 and 3 . .

. 2, 3, 8

Constitution of Utah, Art. XIII, Sec. 11 . . . . . . . . . ... 3, 12
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Sec. 16-6-16 .. 1-3, 5-9, 12, 13, 15
Utah Code Annotated 1953,
amended
.......

Sec. 16-6-17, as
. ...... 1-3, 5-9, 12, 13, 15

U.S. C. A., Vol. 7, Sec. 904, as amended

14

U.S. C. A., Vol. 7, Sec. 922 . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
MOON LAKE ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION INCORPORATED, a corporation, and UINTAH BASIN TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, INC., a corporation,

Case No.
9010

Plaintiffs,

vs.
THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,

J

Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant is in substantial agreement with the
statement of facts as set forth by the plaintiffs. There is
no significant issue of fact. Defendant concedes that if
Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953,
as amended, are constitutional, the rhintiffs are entitled
to the advantages therein contained. The constitutionality
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of these statutes being the sole issue we here set forth the
sections for analysis.
Section 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, provides:
"Property of cooperative nonprofit electric corporations, organized under this chapter and operating
facilities financed pursuant to the Rural Electrification Act of 1936, shall not be valued for the purpo~e
of ad valorem taxation in excess of $50 times the
number of miles of primary distribution of transmission lines."
Section 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, provides:
"Property of cooperative nonprofit telephone
corporations organized under this chapter and financed pursuant to the United States Rural Electrification Act of 1936, as amended, shall not be valued
for the purpose of ad valorem taxation in excess of
$10.00 times the number of circuit miles of line constituting the telephone system."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
SECTION 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 AND SECTION
16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.

POINT II.
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17,
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SEC-
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TION 11, ARTICLE XIII, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
POINT III.
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17,
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
SECTION 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953 AND SECTION
16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE
SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Section 2, Article XIII of the Constitution of the State
of Utah provides in part:
"All tangible property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under this
constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value,
to be ascertained as provided by law. * * *"
Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution of the State
of Utah, provides in part:
"The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all
tangible property in the State, according to its value
in money, and shall prescribe by law such regulations
as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such
property, so that every person and corporation shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its
tangible property, * * * "
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In State v. Thomas, 16 U. 86, 50 P. 615, this Court gave
meaning to these sections as follows:

"* * * The real intent, however, of the
framers of the constitution, is made more manifest
in section 3 of article 13, which contains this language: 'The legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on
all property in the state, according to its value in
money, and shall prescribe by general law such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of all property; so that every person and corporation
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her,
or its property.' This provision is closely related to
the one in section 2, and directs the legislature not
only to provide a unifor:m and equal rate of assessment and taxation, so that every subject owning
property shall pay the same rate of tax as every
other such subject, but also declares that all property shall be assessed at a basis which shall be 'according to its value in money.' It is evident that the
term 'according to its value in money' means that
all property shall be valued, for the purposes of assessment, as near as is reasonably practicable, at its
full cash value; in other words, that the valuation
for assessment and taxation shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal to, the cash price for which
the property valued would sell in open market, for
this is doubtless the correct test of the value .of property. The manifest intention is that all taxable property shall bear its just proportion of the burdens of
taxation. These two sections of the constitution harmonize with each other; and, by reading and considering them together, it becomes clear that all taxable property within this state must be assessed and
taxed on a valuation fixed at its actual cash value,
or as near such value as is reasonably practicable.
* * *" (Italics added.)
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Heretofore we have set forth Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A.
1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended. Analysis of
those statutes in light of the case authority cited evidences
a violation of the foregoing constitutional provisions in
these respects :
Regardless of the full cash value of its property, or
the cash price for which the property valued would sell on
the open market, and despite the principle that all tangible
property shall bear its just burden of taxation, a cooperative identified in the statutes in question enjoys a fixed
ceiling or limitation on the valuation of its property, quite
unknown to other persons, associations or corporations.
Can all property be taxed in "proportion to its value", or
"according to its value in money" if the valuation cannot
be "in excess of $50 times" the number of miles of transmission lines, or cannot be "in excess of $10 tim.es the number of circuit miles" of telephone lines.? Obviously the answer is in the negative. Property cannot truly be taxed
"according to ~ts value in money" if a monetary limitation
is placed on the extent of valuation. The Constitution of
Utah is clearly violated in this respect by Section 16-6-16,
U. C. A. 1953, and Section 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended. State v. Thomas, supra.
1.

2. Even though the Utah constitutional provisions
heretofore quoted make "all tangible property" subject to
assessment and taxation, with certain exceptions not material here, Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17,
U. C. A. 1953, as amended, subject the cooperatives thereunder to ad valorem taxation only to the extent a specific
type of property is owned by the cooperative. In the one
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case property of certain cooperative nonprofit electric corporations shall not be valued for the purpose of ad valorem
taxation in excess of $50 times the number of miles of primary distribution of transmission lines. Section 16-6-16,
U. C. A. 1953. A limit of ten dollars· times the number of
circuit miles of line constituting the telephone system is
basic to valuation of the property of the cooperative nonprofit telephone corporations under Section 16-6-17, U. C. A.
1953, as amended. Now, by what magic in taxation logic
and experience may the required assessment of all tangible
property be conditioned on the extent of ownership of a
peculiar species of property?
There is no necessary correlation between the peculiar
property basic to the formulae in Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A.
1953 and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, and all tangible property owned by the cooperatives in question. Ownership of the former gives no certain indication of the value
of the latter. Cooperatives may have equal line mileage,
yet vary in tangible property valuation depending on density
of customer population, geographical conditions, and the
type and extent of service required by the customers. Quite
contrary to producing the true cash value of all tangible
property of the cooperatives in question, assessment of a
specific type of property of the cooperative results in (a)
a valuation of that specific property only for taxation purposes or (b) if a limit on the valuation of the specific property is en1braced in the valuation formula, as is the case
here, the resulting assessment may be only a fraction of
the full cash value of the specfic property, and a fortiori,
a smaller fraction of the full cash value of all tangible property.
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3. By adopting the formulae of Sections 16-6-16, U.
C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended, the Legislature of Utah has extended exemptions to the cooperatives
therein identified in that the full cash valuation is subject
to a "ceiling", and only applicable to specific tangible property. We are of the conviction that the paramount law of
this state precludes the escape from taxation of that property represented by, and to the extent of, the valuation over
and above the maximum rate set forth in the foregoing
statutes, and the exemption from taxation of tangible property other than that therein specified.
According to State v. Armstrong, 17 U. 166, 53 P. 981:

"* * * The meaning and intent manifest
from the constitution are that no property shall be
relieved from the burden of maintaining the government, except such as was defined and specified for
exemption by that instrument. No one would contend for a moment that the legislature of this state
has power in express terms to exempt property from
taxation, other than that enumerated for exemption
in the constitution; and yet in the enactment of the
statute in question the legislature has undertaken to
indirectly exempt property not so enumerated. This
is an attempt to do indirectly that which could not
be done directly, and the statute therefore is in violation of the constitution, and is void, as in excess of
legislative authority. To prevent the legislature from
exempting property not included within the exemp- ·
tions of the constitution, express words of inhibition
were not necessary. The positive direction that 'all
property not exempt under the laws. of the United
States or under this constitution shall be taxed,' and
that the rate of assessment and taxation shall be
'uniform and equal,' so that 'every person and cor-
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poration shall pay a tax in proportion to the value
of his, her, or its property,' with the enumeration of
the property exempted, contains an implication
against an exemption of any other property by the
legislature. That direction itself operates as. a restraint upon the legislative power. Cooley, Const.
Lim. 209; Konold v. Railway Co., 16 Utah 151."
It appears most fundamental that no exemption from
taxation may be extended by the Legislature, unless. authorized by the Constitution. That no such authority exists for
the relief from the burden of maintaining the government
accorded the plaintiffs, we respectfully submit.
4. As noted, Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution of Utah, states :

"The Legislature shall provide by law a .uniform
and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all
tangible property in the state according to its value
in money. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Violative of this provision are the statutes, Sections
16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as
amended, which permit of taxation neither equally nor
impartially laid on the taxpayers. The cooperatives identified by these statutes cannot be treated or classified for
taxation purposes on a basis distinct and separate from
other persons, associations, or corporations engaged in the
same activity and owning property of an identical nature.
Plaintiffs apparently recognize one aspect of the "uniform and equal" principle when they write on page 23 of
their brief as follows :

"* * * Whatever may be the justification of
this practice with respect to highly profitable enter-
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prises that have reached full earning power, it is
abundantly clear, under court decisions of every
state, that valuation based upon earning power is
peculiarly appropriate to the enterprises here under
discussion. This is not because they are cooperatives
but because of the kind of territory in which they
operate. A stock corporation organized for profit

and operating in similar territory, should of course
be assessed on the same basis and with the same results. * * *" (Emphasis added.)
Erroneously, plaintiffs seem to imply that the special
advantage accorded them is not because of their cooperative status, but because of the geographical territory served.
Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953,
as amended, clearly specify the basis for the exemption as
being the, cooperative status., and at that, a particular genus
of cooperative.
However, the plaintiffs do consider it but equitable that
stock companies operating in like territory should be assessed on the same basis as the plaintiffs, and with the
same results. Be that as it may, the Legislature was
prompted by no such principle of equality when it enacted
the legislation in question. The special exemptions and
limitations therein are restricted to the few identified.
In Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272, this
Court held:

"* * * The power of classification is not
precluded by a constitutional provision that taxation
be equal and uniform, but the fact that a statute
makes no distinction between those in a class does
not of itself justify special exemptions, additional
deductions, or lower rates to those within a particu-
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lar class unless the Constitution provides that taxation shall be uniform 'upon the same class of subjects.' * * *
"This section [the Montana statute] provides
one system for assessing the property of national
banks and another for assessing the moneyed capital
employed in any other bank. Nationa'l bank stock
is assessed at its market value, the full value of the
real estate being deducted. This legislation was held
constitutional and valid in Hilger v. Moore (Mont.)
182 Pac. 477, in an exhaustive and well-considered
opinion. But the Constitution of Montana contains
an important clause that the Constitution of this
state does not contain. Section 11 of article 12 of
the Montana Constitution provides: 'Taxes shall be
levied and collected by general laws and for public
purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same
class of subjects within the territorial limits of the
authority levying the tax.' Were a similar provision
in the Utah Constitution, we should without hesitation uphold section 5869 as a valid act of classification. Many courts have upheld as valid and notrepugnant to the Constitution similar statutory provisions, but an examination of the constitutional provisions upon which these decisions are based will,
we think, disclose that they are invariably based upon
a constitutional provision similar to that above
quoted from the Montana Constitution. Our section
5869 operates with uniformity upon a class, but the
difficulty of reconciling it with the Constitution of
this state is, th~t it is a special privilege, an added
benefit, to one class which is accorded to no other.
The section under consideration plainly gives to bank
stockholders a deduction given to no other class of
taxpayers. After provision is made for taxing bank
stock, section 5869 says that in making such assessment there must also be deducted an additional sum
to be ascertained in the manner therein provided.
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This is an exception or deduction not accord'ed to
other classes or groups of taxpayers, and is, therefore, beyond any question of doubt, repugnant to the
Constitution, which provides for uniformity of taxation. Not only do we find no warrant in the Constitution that permits the deduction made by the Legislature, but, in our opinion, the deduction is prohibited by the Constitution. Suppose the Legislature
had enacted a law putting farmers in a separate
class for purposes of taxation, and had given them
a flat 20 per cent reduction in the assessment of
their property. Would any one question the invalidity of such a law? It would be rank and indefensible
class legislation that could not possibly be harmonized with the Constitution. * * *"
In the case at bar the plaintiffs have been placed in a
separate class for taxation purposes and given limitations
and exemptions on the assessment basis of their property.
Is this not the rank, inequitable, indefensible, class legislation of the type referred to in the Lynch decision? Certainly,
for the classification in this case results in discrimination,
and the legislation permitting the exemption and deduction
partakes of neither "uniformity" nor "equality," nor is the
tax impartially laid on all taxpayers, who, absent the statute, would find themselves occupying the same status before
the law.
At this point in our discussion we consider it appropriate to analyze the approach of the plaintiffs as set forth
in their brief.
Plaintiffs' syllogism is: (1) Earning power is the
primary element in ascertaining property valuation. (2)
REA financed telephone and electric cooperatives have
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low earning power because they serve rural areas. (3)
Ergo, the property of a cooperative should not be valued for
taxation purposes in excess of $10 ($50), times the wire
miles of its system.
The defendant acknowledges earning power as one
element in ascertaining property value, recognizes. that the
plaintiff cooperatives serve rural areas, but questions the
conclusion as being a non sequitur. Fixing a maximum for
valuation purposes does not reflect a formula wherein earning power, or any of the other elements necessary to ascertain full cash value, is applied. What if the earning power
justifies a valuation in excess of the statutory ceiling? If
anything, the statutes. in question preclude full consideration of earning power as a factor in valuation. Logic and
reason give no comfort to the position of plaintiffs.
POINT II.
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17,
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SECTION 11, ARTICLE XIII, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Section 11, Article XIII, of the Constitution of Utah,
provides in part :

"* * * It [the State Tax Commission] shall
assess mines and public utilities and adjust and
equalize the valuation and assessment of property
among the several counties. * * *"
In State ex rel. P. S. C. v. Southern Pacific Co. et al.,
95 U. 84, 79 P. 2d 25, this Court stated :
"We conclude therefore the Constitution has
conferred on the State Tax Commission the power
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of assessment of utilities, which includes fixing of
valuations on utility property, and that this, duty
and power cannot be directly exercised by the Legislature or by it conferred on any other officer or
board, * * * "
By enacting Sections 16-6-16 and 16-6-17, supra, the
Utah Legislature has attempted to exercise the power of
assessment of plaintiff utilities, including the fixing of the
valuations of utility property, all in contravention of the
Constitution and precedent of this court.
1

POINT III.
SECTIONS 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, AND 16-6-17,
U. C. A. 1953, AS AMENDED, VIOLATE SECTION 26, ARTICLE VI, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
Section 26, Article VI, of the Constitution of Utah,
provides in part :
"The Legislature is prohibited from enacting
any private or spedal laws in the following cases:

"*

* *

"8. Assessing and collecting taxes.
"* * *
"16. Granting to an individual, association or
corporation any privilege, immunity or franchise.
"* * *
"In all cases where a general law can be applicable, no special law shall be enacted. * * *"
A law is special when it is not founded on natural,
intrinsic, or constitutional distinctions which reasonably
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justify difference in treatment, or where a classification is
unrelated to a legitimate object to be accomplished. See 50
Am. Jur., Statutes, Sec. 7; 82 C. J. S., Statutes, Sec. 166 and
cases cited therein; 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction,
3rd Ed., Sec. 2104. Although the form of the Utah laws
under consideration is general, the result is "identification"
rather than legitimate classification. The statutes, by a
process of selection through counter generalizations, have
eliminated what might otherwise be natural classifications.
For example:
(a) The classification is not broad enough to apply
to all cooperatives. A cooperative must be financed under
the REA Act of 1936 before it is entitled to benefit of the
statutes in question.
(b) The classification is not broad enough to apply
to all nonprofit associations financed pursuant to the REA
Act of 1936. Loans for rural electrification under the REA
Act of 1936 may be made to "persons, corporations, states,
territories, and subdivisions and agencies thereof, municipalities, peoples' utility districts and cooperative, nonprofit,
or limited dividend associations, * * *." See 7 U. S.
C. A., Section 904, as amended. Loans for rural telephone
service under the REA Act of 1936 may be made to "persons
now providing or who may hereafter provide telephone service in rural areas and to cooperative, nonprofit, limited
dividend, or mutual associations." See 7 U. S. C. A., Sec.
922.
The fact that cooperatives have been segregated from
the numerous other participants under the REA program,
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for purposes of state taxation, can only add to the conclusion that the Utah tax statutes in question constitute special
legislation.
(c) The classification is not broad enough to include
all associations, for profit or otherwise, which serve similar
territory, own property of an identical nature, enjoy the
same net profit, or even adopting plaintiffs' theme, have
the same earning power.
We are convinced that the equality so fundamental to
general legislation finds no part in Sections 16-6-16, U. C.
A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A. 1953, as amended. The classifications therein are arbitrary. An underlying legitimate
object to be accomplished thereby :-enumerate, the Legislature did not ; and imagine, we can not.

CONCLUSION
Sections 16-6-16, U. C. A. 1953, and 16-6-17, U. C. A.
1953, as amended, are unconstitutional. The legislation:
(1)

Does not permit taxation of all tangible property.

(2)

Does not permit of property valuation in money.

( 3) Relieves certain property of the burden of taxation, not otherwise exempted by the Constitution.
(4) Does not provide a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation.
(5) Usurps the power of assessment of utilities conferred by the Constitution upon the State Tax Commission.
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( 6)
lation.

Arbitrarily classifies., constituting special legis-

If taxation can be termed one of the most offensive
powers of government, how much more repulsive is tax legislation which breeds partiality, inequality, special privilege
and exemption, and creates. a complex wherein all property
does not bear its just proportion of the burdens of taxation,
and every person and corporation does not pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property.
The writ should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Attorney General,
RAYMOND W. GEE,
Assistant Attorney General,
JOHN G. MARSHALL,
Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for Defendant.
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